Page 146 - SELECTED WORKS OF ZHOU ENLAI Volume I

142 ZHOU ENLAI
Affairs. Peng Shuzhi quoted Marxist classics at length to prove it
unacceptable. But when asked what we should do, he had no answer
except that we should discuss the matter. When others came up with
suggestions, he again quoted the classics at length, saying that this idea
wouldn’t work and that idea was wrong. The discussion went on for
seven days without result. Then Zhang Guotao adopted a very dis-
honest tactic and asked all present to sign in favour of acceptance
of the bill. Thus a third important concession was made. It was a
major concession on party affairs.
As a result, Chiang Kai-shek, the right-winger, gained the greatest
advantage. He promoted Zhang Jingjiang, who was really a puppet
176
in the hands of Chen Guofu, to the presidency of the Central Execu-
tive Committee. Chiang himself became the Director of the Organi-
zation Department and concurrently the Director of the newly estab-
l i she d Mi l i t a ry De p a rt m e nt . T he Orga n i z a t i o n De pa r t m e nt wa s
actually run by Chen Lifu. Several directorates (of the Departments
of Propaganda, Peasant Affairs, etc.) that we had previously held were
given up. Thus the right wing became predominant organizationally,
and we lost all our positions as far as party affairs were concerned.
Using their positions, Chen Guofu and Chen Lifu recruited right-
wingers in the provinces. In north China they relied on the Great
League of Ding Weifen and Wang Faqin and bought over the West-
177
ern Hills Clique. From then on the struggle between the left and right
wings heated up in the local headquarters of the Kuomintang as well.
In spite of the triple victory Chiang Kai-shek had won politically,
militarily and in party affairs, it was still possible to retrieve the situa-
tion. Had we launched a strong counter-offensive, Chiang Kai-shek’s
right-wing force could have been beaten. For even at that time there
were only six divisions under his direct control. Of the eight armies,
only one was his. The party representatives were Comrade Li Fu-
chun 178 in the Second Army, Comrade Zhu Kejing 179 in the Third
180
Army, Luo Han (still a Communist at the time) in the Fourth Army
and Comrade Lin Boqu 181 in the Sixth Army. But Chen Duxiu con-
tinued to make crucial mistakes in his opportunist leadership during
the Northern Expedition.
Militarily, we were absolutely certain of success in the Northern
Expedition. We had a detailed plan, and General Galen guaranteed
117
that Wuhan would be taken before the Double Tenth Festival. 182
Before setting out, General Galen asked me to seek direction from the
Central Committee as to whether we should assist Chiang Kai-shek