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134 MAO TSE-TUNG

surer we shall be of victory and the earlier we shall win it. We believe
that only in this way can the course of the war be shortened, and we
reject the theory of quick victory, which is just idle talk and an effort
to get things on the cheap.

WHY A PROTRACTED WAR?

30. Let us now examine the problem of protracted war. A correct
answer to the question “Why a protracted war?” can be arrived at
only on the basis of all the fundamental contrasts between China and
Japan. For instance, if we say merely that the enemy is a strong
imperialist power while we are a weak semi-colonial and semi-feudal
country, we are in danger of falling into the theory of national sub-
jugation. For neither in theory nor in practice can a struggle become
protracted by simply pitting the weak against the strong. Nor can it
become protracted by simply pitting the big against the small, the pro-
gressive against the reactionary, or abundant support against meagre
support. The annexation of a small country by a big one or of a big
country by a small one is a common occurrence. It often happens that a
progressive country which is not strong is destroyed by a big, reactionary
country, and the same holds for everything that is progressive but
not strong. Abundant or meagre support is an important but a sub-
sidiary factor, and the degree of its effect depends upon the funda-
mental factors on both sides. Therefore when we say that the War
of Resistance Against Japan is a protracted war, our conclusion is
derived from the interrelations of all the factors at work on both sides.
The enemy is strong and we are weak, and the danger of subjugation
is there. But in other respects the enemy has shortcomings and we have
advantages. The enemy’s advantage can be reduced and his short-
comings aggravated by our efforts. On the other hand, our advantages
can be enhanced and our shortcoming remedied by our efforts. Hence,
we can win final victory and avert subjugation, while the enemy will
ultimately be defeated and will be unable to avert the collapse of
his whole imperialist system.
31. Since the enemy has advantages only in one respect but short-
comings in all others and we have shortcomings in only one respect
but advantages in all others, why has this produced not a balance,
but, on the contrary, a superior position for him and an inferior