Page 431 - SELECTED WORKS OF ZHU DE

NOTES 427

circlement and suppression” of the Central Revolutionary Base Area during the
Second Revolutionary Civil War. In late 1932, Chiang Kai-shek assembled 400,000
to 500,000 troops against the Central Revolutionary Base Area in a concerted attack
by converging columns. From February to March 1933, drawing on the experience
gained in the previous three campaigns against “encirclement and suppression”,
Zhou Enlai and Zhu De commanded the Red Army’s First Front Army by adopting
the strategy of concentrating forces to wipe out the enemy units one by one in mobile
warfare. The Red Army annihilated nearly three enemy divisions in two ambushes
at Huangbei and Dongbei, thus smashing the enemy’s fourth “encirclement and
suppression” campaign. (See Note 4.) 139
150 “Short, swift thrusts” was a tactical principle advocated by Li Teh (Otto
Braun, a military advisor from the Communist International) during the fifth cam-
paign against the enemy’s “encirclement and suppression”. They meant that when-
ever the enemy built blockhouses and entrenched his forces at every step, the Chi-
nese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army also built blockhouses to defend its posi-
tions. And whenever the enemy troops left the blockhouses to advance, the Red
Army would make swift thrusts at them from a short distance. This tactical principle
served leaders who were then making “Left” errors and following a purely defen-
sive strategy. 139
151
The Zunyi Meeting was an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party held at Zunyi, Guizhou Prov-
ince, in January 1935. It focused on rectifying the “Left” errors in military affairs,
ended the domination of the “Left” adventurist line in the central leadership,
established the leadership of Mao Zedong in the Red Army and in the Party’s
central leading body and saved the Red Army and the Party from destruction at
that most critical juncture. 139
152
Huang Kecheng (1902- ), a native of Yongxing, in Hunan Province, was
both commander and political commissar of the New Fourth Army’s 3rd Division.
139
153 This refers to the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party held at Luochuan, northern Shaanxi,
in August 1937. At this meeting, Mao Zedong delivered reports on military affairs
and the relationship between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. The meet-
ing adopted the “Decision on the Present Situation and the Tasks of the Party”
and the “Ten-Point Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation”. It
analysed the political situation since the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against
Japan, pointing out that the differences between the Communist Party and the
Kuomintang were no longer about whether to wage a war of resistance but how to
win it, and that the key to victory lay in carrying out the policy of total resistance
advocated by the Communist Party and opposing the policy of partial resistance
advocated by the Kuomintang. Therefore, it was concluded that the Party should
boldly launch an independent guerrilla warfare in the enemy’s rear and set up anti-
Japanese base areas behind enemy lines; that in Kuomintang areas it should
boldly launch anti-Japanese mass movements and secure the political and economic
rights of the people throughout the country; and that reduction of rents and interest
should be its basic policy for solving the peasants’ land problem during the War
of Resistance Against Japan. 139
154
In autumn 1938, the Japanese aggressors occupied Guangdong Province.
Under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, the Dongjiang, Qiongya,
Zhujiang and Hanjiang Columns, the Central Guangdong People’s Anti-Japanese