Page 242 - SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG Volume I.indd

236 MAO TSE-TUNG

but even for the strategic offensive. As long as there is no fundamental
change in the over-all balance of forces, both strategy and tactics
involve the defensive and the offensive, containing actions and
assaults, and “attacks on all fronts” are in fact extremely rare.
This slogan expresses the military equalitarianism which accompanies
military adventurism.
In 1933 the exponents of military equalitarianism put forward the
theory of “striking with two ‘fists’ ” and splitting the main force of
the Red Army in two, to seek victories simultaneously in two strategic
directions. As a result, one fist remained idle while the other was
tired out with fighting, and we failed to win the greatest victory
possible at the time. In my opinion, when we face a powerful enemy,
we should employ our army, whatever its size, in only one main
direction at a time, not two. I am not objecting to operations in two
or more directions, but at any given time there ought to be only one
main direction. The Chinese Red Army, which entered the arena of
the civil war as a small and weak force, has since repeatedly defeated
its powerful antagonist and won victories that have astonished the
world, and it has done so by relying largely on the employment of
concentrated strength. Any one of its great victories can prove this
point. When we say, “Pit one against ten, pit ten against a hundred”,
we are speaking of strategy, of the whole war and the over-all balance
of forces, and in the strategic sense that is just what we have been
doing. However, we are not speaking of campaigns and tactics, in
which we must never do so. Whether in counter-offensives or offen-
sives, we should always concentrate a big force to strike at one part
of the enemy forces. We suffered every time we did not concentrate
our troops, as in the battles against Tan Tao-yuan in the Tungshao
area of Ningtu County in Kiangsi Province in January 1931, against
the 19th Route Army in the Kaohsinghsu area of Hsingkuo County in
Kiangsi in August 1931, against Chen Chi-tang in the Shuikouhsu
area of Nanhsiung County in Kwangtung Province in July 1932, and
against Chen Cheng in the Tuantsun area of Lichuan County in
Kiangsi in March 1934. In the past, battles such as those of Shuikouhsu
and Tuantsun were generally deemed victories or even big victories
(in the former we routed twenty regiments under Chen Chi-tang, in
the latter twelve regiments under Chen Cheng), but we never wel-
comed such victories and in a certain sense even regarded them as
defeats. For, in our opinion, a battle has little significance when there
are no prisoners or war booty, or when they do not outweigh the losses.