Page 243 - SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG Volume I.indd

STRATEGY IN CHINA’S REVOLUTIONARY WAR 237
Our strategy is “pit one against ten” and our tactics are “pit ten
against one” — this is one of our fundamental principles for gaining
mastery over the enemy.
Military equalitarianism reached its extreme point in our fifth
counter-campaign against “encirclement and suppression” in 1934. It
was thought that we could beat the enemy by “dividing the forces
into six routes” and “resisting on all fronts”, but instead we were
beaten by the enemy, and the reason was fear of losing territory.
Naturally one can scarcely avoid loss of territory when concentrating
the main forces in one direction while leaving only containing forces
in others. But this loss is temporary and partial and is compensated
for by victory in the place where the assault is made. After such
a victory is won, territory lost in the area of the containing forces
can be recovered. The enemy’s first, second, third and fourth campaigns
of “encirclement and suppression” all entailed the loss of territory —
particularly the third campaign, in which the Kiangsi base area of
the Red Army was almost completely lost — but in the end we not
only recovered but extended our territory.
Failure to appreciate the strength of the people in the base area
has often given rise to unwarranted fear of moving the Red Army
too far away from the base area. This happened when the Red Army
in Kiangsi made a long drive to attack Changchow in Fukien Province
in 1932, and also when it wheeled around to attack Fukien after the
victory in our fourth counter-campaign in 1933. There was fear in
the first case that the enemy would seize the entire base area, and
in the second that he would seize part of it; consequently there was
opposition to concentrating our forces and advocacy of dividing
them up for defence, but in the end all this proved to be wrong.
As far as the enemy is concerned, he is afraid to advance into our
base area, but the main danger in his eyes is a Red Army that has
driven into the White area. His attention is always fixed on the
whereabouts of the main force of the Red Army, and he rarely takes
his eyes off it to concentrate on the base area. Even when the Red
Army is on the defensive, it is still the centre of the enemy’s attention.
Part of his over-all plan is to reduce the size of our base area, but if
the Red Army concentrates its main force to annihilate one of his
columns, the enemy’s supreme command will be compelled to focus
greater attention on the Red Army and concentrate larger forces
against it. Hence it is possible to wreck an enemy plan for reducing
the size of a base area.